The President’s speech writer had to make a last-minute addition to his TV talk tonight about “the way forward” in Iraq.
Right after “The changes in Anbar show all Iraqis what becomes possible when extremists are driven out,” he had to add “Earlier today, one of the brave tribal sheiks who helped lead the revolt against al-Qaeda was murdered.” Abu Risha was the head of the Anbar Awakening Council with whom the President had posed for a smiling picture just 10 days ago.
“This is a tragic loss," Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, said of the Sunni sheik's death. "It shows how significant his importance was and it shows al-Qaeda in Iraq remains a very dangerous and barbaric enemy."
By the inverted logic that is by now so familiar, the assassination of the key man in our Anbar “victory” proves how desperate the defeated enemy has become.
As a reminder that we are fighting on at least two fronts, another U.S. general said today that an attack on our headquarters garrison this week was carried out with the kind of 240 mm rocket that Iran provides to Shiite extremists.
One person was killed and 11 wounded in the attack Tuesday at Camp Victory, the headquarters of Multinational Forces-Iraq, by a rocket from a Baghdad district infiltrated by breakaway factions of the Mahdi Army militia of Muqtada al-Sadr.
For anyone keeping score, that keeps the Sunni and Shiite murderers tied in what the President tonight termed “the gains we are making” in Iraq. But as he reassured us, it’s going to be a long contest, even if it has to go into overtime.
Showing posts with label Sunnis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sunnis. Show all posts
Friday, September 14, 2007
Wednesday, August 08, 2007
A Sane Re-Start for the Iraq Debate
After all the wishful thinking and political posturing on all sides, a basis for serious discussion makes the “tenuous case” for staying in Iraq while scaling down our presence.
The report urging “strategic patience” is by Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank chaired by former Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, with a bipartisan board including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and William S. Cohen, a former Republican Senator who was Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton.
Some recent advances in Iraq, Cordesman writes, are the result of “sheer luck,” such as Sunni tribesmen turning against Al Qaeda insurgents. He quotes an unnamed U.S. official as describing our situation as "three dimensional chess in the dark while someone is shooting at you."
Rejecting the extremes of staying the course or immediate withdrawal, Cordesman makes a case for phasing down troop levels starting early next year.
His analysis and recommendations will draw fire for being too qualified, too middle-of-the-road and politically unsatisfying. But they have the ring of reality, something so rare in the furor over Iraq that has made Americans unhappy with both the Bush Administration and the Democratic Congress elected to oppose him.
Here, at least, is a starting point for facing the true options and thinking seriously about them.
As Cordesman writes, “The U.S. will ultimately be judged far more by how it leaves Iraq, and what it leaves behind, than how it entered Iraq.”
We’ve lost the war. Can we win the withdrawal?
The report urging “strategic patience” is by Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank chaired by former Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, with a bipartisan board including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and William S. Cohen, a former Republican Senator who was Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton.
Some recent advances in Iraq, Cordesman writes, are the result of “sheer luck,” such as Sunni tribesmen turning against Al Qaeda insurgents. He quotes an unnamed U.S. official as describing our situation as "three dimensional chess in the dark while someone is shooting at you."
Rejecting the extremes of staying the course or immediate withdrawal, Cordesman makes a case for phasing down troop levels starting early next year.
His analysis and recommendations will draw fire for being too qualified, too middle-of-the-road and politically unsatisfying. But they have the ring of reality, something so rare in the furor over Iraq that has made Americans unhappy with both the Bush Administration and the Democratic Congress elected to oppose him.
Here, at least, is a starting point for facing the true options and thinking seriously about them.
As Cordesman writes, “The U.S. will ultimately be judged far more by how it leaves Iraq, and what it leaves behind, than how it entered Iraq.”
We’ve lost the war. Can we win the withdrawal?
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
Killers in Iraq: The Saudi Connection
Almost half of the insurgents American troops are fighting in Iraq came from our staunch ally, Saudi Arabia.
According to U.S. military figures just published in the Los Angeles Times, “About 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15 percent are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10 percent are from North Africa.”
The Saudi government knows that and says it is doing everything possible to prevent Sunni extremists from migrating to the killing fields of Iraq. But is it?
The signals are getting decidedly mixed. Until recently, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was ambassador to Washington until 2005, had Bush and Cheney eating out of his hand. But then last month, his uncle, King Abdullah told Arab heads of state that Americans in Iraq were “an illegal foreign occupation.”
“Saudi frustration,” the New York Times reported this weekend, “has mounted over the past four years, as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated. King Abdullah was angry that the Bush administration ignored his advice against de-Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi military.”
Now questions arise: How hard are the Saudis trying to stem the tide of their Sunni jihadists into Iraq? To what extent is exporting troublemakers in their domestic interest and part of an unspoken policy? How much pressure are they putting on the Bush Administration to stay in Iraq by threatening to support Sunni fighters against Iran-backed Shiites if we leave? Behind it all, how much of American policy is driven by placating the Saudis to ensure the continuing flow of their oil to which we are addicted?
In the Middle East, keeping up with your friends can be as exhausting as fighting your enemies. Pakistan is another example. Stay tuned.
According to U.S. military figures just published in the Los Angeles Times, “About 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15 percent are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10 percent are from North Africa.”
The Saudi government knows that and says it is doing everything possible to prevent Sunni extremists from migrating to the killing fields of Iraq. But is it?
The signals are getting decidedly mixed. Until recently, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was ambassador to Washington until 2005, had Bush and Cheney eating out of his hand. But then last month, his uncle, King Abdullah told Arab heads of state that Americans in Iraq were “an illegal foreign occupation.”
“Saudi frustration,” the New York Times reported this weekend, “has mounted over the past four years, as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated. King Abdullah was angry that the Bush administration ignored his advice against de-Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi military.”
Now questions arise: How hard are the Saudis trying to stem the tide of their Sunni jihadists into Iraq? To what extent is exporting troublemakers in their domestic interest and part of an unspoken policy? How much pressure are they putting on the Bush Administration to stay in Iraq by threatening to support Sunni fighters against Iran-backed Shiites if we leave? Behind it all, how much of American policy is driven by placating the Saudis to ensure the continuing flow of their oil to which we are addicted?
In the Middle East, keeping up with your friends can be as exhausting as fighting your enemies. Pakistan is another example. Stay tuned.
Labels:
Bush,
Cheney,
Iran,
Iraq,
jihadists,
King Abdullah,
Middle East,
oil,
Prince Bandar,
Saudi Arabia,
Shiite,
Sunnis
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Killing Field Without a Scorecard
A dozen Sunni tribal leaders died in a Baghdad bombing yesterday, and we’re still waiting for the terrorists to tell us who did it and why.
Hannah Allam, the McClatchy newspapers’ bureau chief, reports today: “As of late Monday, al Qaida hasn't claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing on the Internet message boards it typically uses, leading some tribal leaders to wonder whether another enemy might have targeted the meeting.
“Possible suspects range from Shiite groups such as the Mahdi Army to (Sheik) al Gaood's tribal comrades, who'd accused him of dealing behind their backs. News reports quoted at least one member of the Salvation Council, the group of tribal leaders who've pledged to hunt insurgents with ties to al Qaida, as saying that al Gaood and the other sheiks who were killed Monday had been dismissed from the group because of side deals they made with the Shiite-led Iraqi government.”
Our young people there are in harm’s way without knowing who’s who or what they can do to quell violence from too many sources to keep track of in a land of “shifting alliances, missed opportunities and lives ended in murky circumstances.”
Hannah Allam, the McClatchy newspapers’ bureau chief, reports today: “As of late Monday, al Qaida hasn't claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing on the Internet message boards it typically uses, leading some tribal leaders to wonder whether another enemy might have targeted the meeting.
“Possible suspects range from Shiite groups such as the Mahdi Army to (Sheik) al Gaood's tribal comrades, who'd accused him of dealing behind their backs. News reports quoted at least one member of the Salvation Council, the group of tribal leaders who've pledged to hunt insurgents with ties to al Qaida, as saying that al Gaood and the other sheiks who were killed Monday had been dismissed from the group because of side deals they made with the Shiite-led Iraqi government.”
Our young people there are in harm’s way without knowing who’s who or what they can do to quell violence from too many sources to keep track of in a land of “shifting alliances, missed opportunities and lives ended in murky circumstances.”
Labels:
Al Qaeda,
Iraq,
suicide bombing,
Sunnis,
tribal leaders
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